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We experimentally demonstrate that a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector is deter-
ministically controllable by bright illumination. We found that bright light can temporarily make
a large fraction of the nanowire length normally-conductive, can extend deadtime after a normal
photon detection, and can cause a hotspot formation during the deadtime with a highly nonlinear
sensitivity. In result, although based on different physics, the superconducting detector turns out
to be controllable by virtually the same techniques as avalanche photodiode detectors. As demon-
strated earlier, when such detectors are used in a quantum key distribution system, this allows
an eavesdropper to launch a detector control attack to capture the full secret key without being
revealed by to many errors in the key.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties,
Alice and Bob, to generate a secret random key at a dis-
tance [1–4]. The key is protected by quantum mechanics:
an eavesdropper Eve must disturb the signals between
Alice and Bob, and therefore reveal her presence. QKD
using perfect devices has been proven secure [5, 6].
Implementations of QKD have to use components
available with current technology, which are usually im-
perfect. While there are numerous security proofs con-
sidering more realistic devices [7–15], these proofs assume
that the imperfections are quantified in terms of certain
source and detector parameters. Due to the difficulty of
characterizing or upper bounding these parameters owing
to limitations of these security proofs, it is common to
use the more established security proofs for ideal systems
also in practical implementations. With actual devices
deviating from the ideal models, numerous security loop-
holes have therefore been identified and usually experi-
mentally confirmed [16–27], and in some cases exploited
in eavesdropping experiments with full secret key extrac-
tion by Eve [28, 29]. Finding and eliminating loopholes
in implementations is crucial to obtain provable practical
security.
As an example, several recent attacks have been based
on bright-light control of avalanche photodiodes (APDs)
[24, 25, 28–34]. Superconducting nanowire single-photon
detectors (SNSPDs) studied in this paper are based on
different physics. However, as we will see, the principles
of attacks on QKD systems using SNSPDs are broadly
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similar to attacks on QKD systems using APDs: Eve uses
a faked-state attack [35], can blind the detectors [24, 25],
make them click with a classical threshold using a bright
pulse [25] or let one detector temporarily recover from
blinding [24]; also, detector’s response to multiphoton
pulses can be superlinear [34]. We refer to these princi-
ples through the paper.
Although SNSPDs have been used in several QKD ex-
periments [36–40], this detector technology is still in its
infancy. No automated unattended operation of systems
containing SNSPDs has been reported. Technical as-
pects of SNSPD operation, such as handling the latching
behavior and converting the nanowire analog response
into a digital detection signal, have only been studied
in the normal single-photon counting regime. So far,
no attempt has been reported to consider SNSPD’s non-
idealities in order to attack a QKD system. This study
thus serves as an early warning. Although we have done
our experiments on only one detector sample, we show
that control by bright light can be achieved through two
separate mechanisms, and may thus be applicable to dif-
ferent detector designs [41]. Regardless of whether the
control mechanisms we have identified apply to other de-
tector designs, our experiment shows that the bright il-
lumination response of the SNSPD is deviating from the
detector model in the simple security proofs for QKD.
Therefore, theoretical and/or experimental effort is re-
quired to re-establish security for QKD systems using
SNSPDs.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we de-
scribe the SNSPD under test. Sections III and IV deal
with the SNSPD in the latched and non-latched states;
in each section we present the physics behind detector’s
reaction to bright-light illumination, then how it can be
exploited to attack QKD. We discuss our findings and
conclude in Sec. V.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Detector circuit. The SNSPD is biased from a battery-powered direct current (DC) source, an equivalent
circuit diagram of which is shown. Pulses produced by the SNSPD travel through ∼ 1m coaxial cable, bias tee (0.1–6000MHz,
Mini-Circuits ZFBT-6GW+), radio-frequency (RF) amplifier (voltage gain 100, 0.1–1500MHz, Phillips Scientific 6954-S-100),
∼ 1.5m coaxial cable, and RF splitter (Mini-Circuits ZN2PD-9G-S+), to the counter and oscilloscope. Inside the oscilloscope
box: normal single-photon response after the RF amplifier and splitter, shown as a single-shot trace with 2GHz bandwidth
(green solid line) and averaged over many pulses (red dashed line). Features appearing 12 ns after the leading edge are attributed
to reflections due to impedance mismatch in the RF circuits.
II. DETECTOR DESIGN AND OPERATION
We performed our tests on an SNSPD of a fairly stan-
dard configuration, which has been characterized in pre-
vious publications [42–44]. The SNSPD chip was man-
ufactured by Scontel, Moscow, and consists of a 4 nm
thick, 120 nm wide NbN nanowire on sapphire substrate,
laid out in a 10 × 10µm meander pattern with 60% fill-
ing ratio. The chip is packaged and installed in a ∼ 1m
long dipstick assembly (see Ref. [43] for details), low-
ered into a Dewar flask. During detector operation, the
chip is immersed into liquid helium at 4.2K. It is op-
tically accessible through a single-mode fibre. The chip
is connected to a room-temperature bias tee and wide-
band radio-frequency (RF) amplifier via a 50Ω coaxial
cable (Fig. 1). A battery-powered current source biases
the superconducting nanowire with Ib = 22.5µA which
is ≈ 0.85 of its critical current Ic (this Ib value pro-
vides the highest ratio of photon detection probability at
1550 nm to dark count rate, for this particular SNSPD
sample). The signal from the output of the RF ampli-
fier is split to a 16GHz single-shot oscilloscope (Tek-
tronix DSA 71604) and a counter (Stanford Research
Systems SR400). Detection efficiency for single photons
at 1550 nm was 2.2 × 10−5 and the dark count rate was
< 1Hz, which is a typical performance for this SNSPD
model (higher detection efficiency can be obtained at
the expense of much higher dark count rate; while this
SNSPD was not optimised for high detection efficiency,
the effects we have observed should qualitatively be the
same as with efficiency-optimised designs [45]). The de-
tector sensitivity was polarization-dependent; in all ex-
periments in this paper polarization was aligned to max-
imize the detection efficiency, using a fiber polarization
controller.
One aspect of detector operation is how the analog
pulse produced by a transient hotspot (see inset in Fig. 1)
is converted into a detection event and assigned a partic-
ular timing. The analog pulse is well-defined, its magni-
tude and shape being nearly constant from one photon
detection to another. Therefore almost any discrimina-
tor design would work for single-photon detection, and its
implementation details (bandwidth, hysteresis, whether
it is a threshold discriminator or a constant-fraction dis-
criminator, etc.) are often omitted in the literature on
SNSPDs. However, as previously discussed for APDs
[46, 47], these details become more important for demon-
stration of detector control by bright light. We assume in
this study that the analog pulse is sensed by a high-speed
voltage comparator, and the detection event timing is
registered by pulse’s leading edge crossing a pre-set com-
parator threshold. Indeed this is how our SR400 counter
operates: it has an adjustable threshold set with 0.2mV
resolution. In our setup, the counter works correctly (reg-
istering one count per one single-photon analog pulse) in
a wide range of threshold settings, +4.4 to +37mV. A
detail not mentioned in the literature is what threshold
level the comparator should be set at, within this working
range. While the setting may not affect normal detector
operation, only a part of this voltage range is reachable
under bright-light control described in the following sec-
tion.
Another interesting aspect of detector operation is
latching. In single-photon detection regime, the hotspot
after formation shrinks quickly and the nanowire returns
3to the superconducting state [48]. However the detec-
tor also has a stable latched state, when a larger self-
heating hotspot persists indefinitely, at a steady current
Ilatched which is a fraction of Ib, and a large voltage across
the SNSPD. The detector is blind to single photons and
does not produce dark counts in this regime. A prop-
erly designed SNSPD does not enter the latched state
after a single-photon detection [48, 49]. However it can
still latch after an electromagnetic interference (which in
our experiment was easily caused by switching on and
off lights and other mains-powered electrical equipment
in the same building). Latching also occurs after a brief
bright illumination: as little as 50 nW, 5ms long single
light pulse at 1550 nm reliably latches the device. In-
creasing the bias current Ib very close to Ic also leads to
latching. The only way to return the detector from the
latched state into the normal regime is to temporarily
reduce Ib below Ilatched. In our experiment, and suppos-
edly in most other experiments reported in the literature,
this was performed manually.
III. DETECTOR CONTROL IN LATCHED
STATE
A. Physics
In the latched state, the Joule heat generated in the
normally-conductive fraction of the nanowire exactly bal-
ances the cooling. The length of the normally-conductive
fraction changes with the voltage applied across the
SNSPD. We investigated this by replacing the battery-
powered bias source with an external bias source con-
sisting of a constant-current source limited at a certain
maximum voltage. Since the SNSPD enters and main-
tains latching at a current lower than the normal bias
current, this bias source automatically turns into a volt-
age source once the device latches. In our experiment,
Ilatched was roughly 7µA regardless of the voltage across
the device, up to 10V (we did not apply higher voltages
to reduce the chance of electrical breakdown). At 10V,
the nanowire resistance was thus ∼ 1.4MΩ. Above the
superconducting transition temperature the resistance
of the entire device is approximately constant, and is
≈ 2.3MΩ [44]. Therefore we concluded that slightly over
half its length was normally-conductive at 10V. During
the experiment, Ilatched would randomly assume a value
in the 6 to 8µA range, which could correspond to the
normally-conductive region shifting and “locking” to the
local variations of nanowire thermal characteristics along
its length.
Next, we investigated what happened when bright
continuous-wave (CW) light was applied in the latched
state. Under illumination, current I through the de-
vice dropped, with a different sensitivity at different
voltages (Fig. 2(a)). When recalculated into device re-
sistance (Fig. 2(b)), we see that at low source volt-
ages the resistance increased by about the same amount
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Response to continuous-wave (CW)
light in the latched state. (a) Current I through the SNSPD
vs. optical power at 1550 nm, at different voltages V applied
across the SNSPD. (b) SNSPD resistance R = V/I .
(350–400 kΩ per 20mW), while at 10V the increase was
smaller (∼110 kΩ). Note that depending on optical cou-
pling, illumination may be unevenly distributed along the
nanowire.
Implementation and maximum voltage of the bias
source is yet another detail that varies between setups
and is rarely specified in the literature. In our detector it
is implemented as a ≈ 0.1V voltage source in series with
≈ 4.5 kΩ resistor (see Fig. 1), with both voltage and resis-
tance being trimmable in a small range to set precise Ib in
the normal (non-latched) regime. When the SNSPD re-
sistance is zero, this bias circuit acts as a current source.
However, in the latched state the SNSPD resistance be-
comes larger than the circuit output impedance, thus
it acts as a voltage source. Measurements done with
this battery-powered bias circuit closely match the 0.1V
curve in Fig. 2.
B. Exploit
The eavesdropper Eve can latch the device by apply-
ing sufficient illumination at the SNSPD, for instance a
single > 50 nW, 5ms long light pulse at 1550 nm. The
latching causes a number of random detection events, de-
pending on the discriminator setting and optical power of
the latching pulse. However, for intense illumination, it
is possible for Eve to latch the device with only a few ran-
dom events (for instance using 5mW optical power for
some ms at 20mV discriminator threshold). Also note
that Eve only have to latch the device once.
In the latched state, the SNSPD is insensitive to single
photons and produces no dark counts (similarly to blind-
ing of APDs [24, 25]). However, the nanowire’s response
to bright CW illumination detailed in Sec. III A also holds
on a nanosecond scale for bright pulses, and can be used
to produce an electrical pulse after the RF amplifier and
splitter (Fig. 3) [50]. The response is caused by a larger
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Electrical response in the latched state
to the 10 ns, 1550 nm optical trigger pulse. All traces are
averaged over 500 samples. The trigger pulse saturates at an
electrical response of about 20mV (see inset), compared to
the normal detection event which reaches peak amplitude of
about 50mV.
piece of the nanowire becoming normally conductive dur-
ing the bright illumination, therefore causing an abrupt
change in the resistance, just as a single photon causes
an abrupt change in the resistance in the normal operat-
ing regime. Note that the electrical response to a bright
trigger pulse saturates at ∼ 20mV when optical power
> 15mW is applied, because at this power the current
through the nanowire is reduced to almost zero.
Since this analog electrical pulse is sensed by a com-
parator, the detector has a highly superlinear detec-
tion probability of bright pulses [34]. By simulating an
ideal bandwidth-limited comparator on recorded wide-
band long oscilloscope traces, we find that the detection
probability would depend strongly on the comparator
threshold (Fig. 4). With the comparator threshold in
the 5–20mV range, the detection probability is highly
superlinear and increases quickly from negligible to a sub-
stantial value for a 3 dB increase in the optical power. A
sufficient condition for a detector control attack is a large
ratio of detection probabilities over a 3 dB change in the
trigger pulse power [25, 34] (or 6 dB change in the trig-
ger pulse power for distributed-phase-reference protocols
[30]). Then Eve can intercept the quantum states from
Alice, and resend bright trigger pulses corresponding to
her detection to Bob [25, 34]. If Eve used a measurement
basis not matching Bob’s, she wants her pulse to remain
undetected. Indeed when the pulse is measured by Bob
in a different basis, it will be split to both detectors, cor-
responding to 3 dB reduction in its power, and almost
never cause a click. Due to the large difference in detec-
tion probability for 3 dB change in the trigger pulse am-
plitude, a detector control attack would cause negligible
errors and not expose eavesdropping, for the comparator
threshold settings . 20mV. Above ∼ 20mV the trigger
pulses stop causing clicks at all, and this attack method
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Detection probability of the 10 ns trig-
ger pulse, depending on the comparator threshold. The prob-
abilities were obtained by simulating a bandwidth-limited
ideal comparator, requiring that the wideband signal recorded
by the oscilloscope spent at least 3 ns above the threshold
level to register a click. A measurement using a real com-
parator SR400 (not shown on the plot) confirmed this strong
superlinearity; jitter of SR400 comparator click in response
to the bright pulse was ∼ 0.5 ns full width at half maximum
(FWHM).
no longer works. However, it may be possible to reach
higher threshold settings using a different attack method
described in the next section.
IV. DETECTOR CONTROL VIA DEADTIME
EXTENSION
A. Physics
In this section we consider a non-latched, single-photon
sensitive normally operating detector. The attack is
based on detector’s ability to form a hotspot in response
to bright light when the current I through the SNSPD
is low. In addition, the hotspot formation probabil-
ity at a low current is strongly superlinear. It is well-
known that at relatively low values of the bias current
Ib, multiphoton processes dominate the detector sensi-
tivity [34, 51, 52]. Here we demonstrate that this effect
becomes extreme during the normal recovery time after
a photon detection.
In normal detector operation, after the hotspot forma-
tion, I drops to a fraction of Ib [48]. Then, I exponen-
tially recovers to Ib at a slow rate, owing to a relatively
large kinetic inductance of the superconducting nanowire
(see dashed trace in Fig. 5). During the initial part of this
recovery, the SNSPD remains insensitive to single pho-
tons, but it can react to a bright illumination by forming
another hotspot, with a higher illumination power being
able to form a hotspot earlier in the recovery. This is
illustrated in Fig. 5, which shows electrical response to
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Electrical response in the non-latched state to the 48 ns, 1550 nm optical pulse. Single-shot traces with
2GHz bandwidth for different pulse powers are shown, as well as an averaged normal single-photon response.
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Accumulated 30,000 oscilloscope traces
of the electrical response to the trigger pulse during the re-
covery from a 48 ns, 2.5mW rectangular optical pulse. The
trigger is (a) 8 ns into the recovery, 25 fJ energy, (b) 3 ns into
the recovery, 78 fJ energy. In both cases the trigger pulse
causes hotspot formation with roughly 50% probability, and
resets the voltage to the same level. All oscillograms at trigger
pulse delays ≥ 2 ns show the same behavior.
a 48 ns long bright pulse. At 0.25mW pulse power, the
single-shot trace clearly shows that the SNSPD forms
a hotspot on average every 6 ns. At 0.5mW, the pe-
riod reduces to ∼ 2.7 ns. At higher optical powers sep-
arate hotspot formations are no longer distinguishable,
but the whole electrical pulse gets higher, indicating a
lower average current through the nanowire during the
optical pulse. Thus, during a sufficiently bright optical
pulse, the electrical signal will stay above the comparator
threshold. This allows Eve to extend the detector dead-
time after the first photon detection, up to 500 ns with
this detector setup, without causing latching.
We further quantify the hotspot formation probability
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FIG. 7. (Color online) Hotspot formation probability vs. en-
ergy of a 53 ps wide trigger pulse, for different trigger pulse
delays after the closing edge of a 48 ns, 2.5mW rectangular
optical pulse (both pulses at 1550 nm). The probabilities were
extracted from recorded oscillograms similar to those shown
in Fig. 6. 10−13 J corresponds to 780,000 photons contained
in the trigger pulse.
during the recovery, by applying a 53 ps FWHM trigger
pulse after the closing edge of the 48 ns, 2.5mW pulse.
(The recovery after the bright pulse should be similar to
the recovery after a single-photon detection, however we
focus on the former for reasons that will become apparent
in the next subsection.) As far as we can see, response to
this trigger pulse is probabilistic and binary: the hotspot
either forms, or it does not (Fig. 6). In the former case
the recovery resets and starts anew from a certain cur-
rent value, in the latter case the recovery continues undis-
turbed. The probability that the trigger pulse causes a
hotspot is plotted in Fig. 7. The measurement shows that
the detection probability is reduced for at least 40 ns. It
also shows that the detector is highly superlinear in at
least the first 10 ns. During this time, a hotspot can be
6formed with unity probability using a sufficiently high-
energy trigger pulse (∼ 150 fJ), while the same trigger
pulse attenuated by 20 dB (i.e., 100 times lower pulse
energy) is very unlikely to cause a hotspot formation.
B. Exploit
Extendability of SNSPD’s deadtime can be exploited
in the earlier described attack [24] on the Bennett-
Brassard 1984 (BB84) and similar protocols. We remark
that the superlinearity is not required for this attack,
but is helpful and makes it easier. Here we propose a ver-
sion of this attack for differential-phase-shift QKD (DPS-
QKD) systems [37, 53]. We explain the key component
of the attack: how Eve can control Bob’s SNSPDs in
the DPS-QKD system. Bob consists of an unbalanced
Mach-Zehnder interferometer, and two detectors D0 and
D1 (Fig. 8(a)). We assume that a properly implemented
Bob will not accept clicks from both detectors for the
duration of recovery after a click in one of the detectors,
in order to avoid the detector deadtime and efficiency
mismatch loopholes [18, 29]. As illustrated above, the
expected recovery is ∼ 40 ns long. Eve begins by ap-
plying to both detectors a laser pulse longer than the
recovery time (Fig. 8(b)), with phase ϕ changing in steps
along the pulse such that its power splits equally to the
two detectors. This pulse produces a double click at the
beginning, which however can be timed to fall in between
the bit slots and be discarded by Bob (the extra clicks
may affect routines that adjust timing of Bob’s accep-
tance windows, but note that attacks on such calibration
routines are also possible [26]). Immediately after this
long pulse, Eve applies a sequence of short pulses. Their
phases are chosen to steer them primarily to one of the
two detectors (similarly to [30, 54]) and form hotspots in
that detector only, keeping the comparator input voltage
above the threshold. In the other detector, the voltage
is allowed to fall below the comparator threshold. Then
a pulse is applied and causes a click only in the detec-
tor that has recovered. Eve can end her control diagram
here, or repeat the long pulse (as shown in Fig. 8(b))
and then make another controlled click. The total length
of such chained control diagram producing several con-
trolled clicks is limited by low-frequency cutoff of the
RF components, and in the case of our setup can be
up to 500 ns. We remark that the short-pulsed parts of
the diagram could in principle be replaced by a single
phase-modulated long pulse, however short pulses may
be easier to steer between Bob’s detectors in case of sub-
nanosecond ∆t used in the modern DPS-QKD systems
[37].
Interferometers used for DPS-QKD are of a sufficiently
good quality to allow Eve an extinction ratio of at least
20 dB when routing her short pulses between the two
Bob’s detectors [37]. Examination of the recovery traces
in Fig. 6 and hotspot formation probabilities in Fig. 7
suggests that the above control diagram will work. It
should allow Eve to make clicks in Bob deterministically,
or close to deterministically, in a wide range of compara-
tor threshold voltages and ∆t, even for ∆t = 100 ps [37]
or/and a threshold voltage above 20mV. Eve should be
able to vary the number of short pulses during the re-
covery to suit these system parameters, and still induce
clicks in the correct detector most of the time.
While we did not have access to a complete DPS-QKD
system to fully verify this Bob control method, we tested
it experimentally by reproducing the expected power di-
agrams (optical power at D0 and D1 in Fig. 8(b)) at the
single detector. We used ∆t = 5ns, and threshold set-
ting of 11.6mV at the SR400 counter. We applied to
the detector 2mW peak power, 53 ns long optical pulse,
followed by 53 ps FWHM short optical pulses of vary-
ing energy. Measurement of the click probability while
varying the short pulse energy showed that nearly perfect
detector control (< 0.005% click probability in the wrong
detector) would be achievable if Bob’s interferometer in
the DPS-QKD system had a reasonable 20 dB extinction
ratio, and good control (< 1% click probability in the
wrong detector) would be possible at a very poor 10 dB
extinction ratio. The extinction ratio of Bob’s interfer-
ometer determines how well Eve can suppress her short
pulses from reaching the wrong detector, while making
the target detector click with nearly unity probability.
Jitter of the controllable click caused by the short pulse
in the target detector was 250 ps FWHM, while that of
the double click caused by the long pulse’s leading edge
was 170 ps FWHM.
One can notice that Eve would need to know Bob’s
detector parameters rather precisely to execute this at-
tack. In modern cryptography, according to Kerckhoffs’
principle [55], properties of equipment are assumed to be
fully known to Eve. In practice, to learn the detector
parameters, Eve might at first try to attack intermit-
tently a few bits at a time (which would not raise the
error rate noticeably) while varying her attack parame-
ters, and watch the public discussion between Alice and
Bob [35]. One can also notice that Eve’s intercept-and-
resend equipment would introduce an insertion delay of
at least some tens of ns. However, photon’s time-of-flight
is not authenticated in today’s implementations of QKD,
and is not a part of the practical QKD protocols. Fur-
thermore, in a fiber-optic line, Eve can easily cancel this
insertion delay by shortcutting a part of the line between
her intercept and resend units with a line-of-sight radio-
frequency classical link [28, 35].
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The experimental results show that the control of this
SNSPD is nearly perfect. Therefore, if this SNSPD were
used in a QKD system, an eavesdropper could use bright
illumination to capture the full raw and secret key, while
introducing negligible errors. Installation of the eaves-
dropper is fully reversible: The detector survived the
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FIG. 8. (Color online) Proposed faked-state attack on the DPS-QKD system. (a) Bob’s optical scheme. ∆t is the time delay
between the two interferometer arms. (b) Diagram showing Eve’s optical output, how her light splits between the two Bob’s
detectors, and how the electrical signals in each detector react to it.
bright illumination with no signs of damage or deteri-
oration [41].
While the SNSPD is based on different physics than the
APD single-photon detector, the similarity in how they
can be controlled is startling. Latching the SNSPD us-
ing bright illumination can be considered as permanently
blinding it, without the need for additional illumination
to keep it blind. In the latched/blind state, the SNSPD
exhibits the same superlinear response to bright trigger
pulses as a blind APD. Likewise, controlling the SNSPD
using deadtime extension is nearly identical to controlling
the APD using deadtime extension: the only difference
is that for this SNSPD the low-frequency cut-off of the
RF components (and on a longer time scale the latch-
ing phenomenon) limits how long the deadtime can be
extended.
Countermeasures against bright illumination attacks
have been discussed extensively [24, 25, 28, 33, 46, 47,
56–58], and the conclusions are equally applicable to
SNSPDs. The difference between public-key cryptogra-
phy and QKD is that for the latter there exist security
proofs. However, when the security is proved for sys-
tems with imperfections, models are used for the devices
in the implementations. Even if this experiment is only
performed on one device, the results show that the re-
sponse deviates considerably from the models in the sim-
ple security proofs that are usually employed [5, 6, 10].
There are more advanced security proofs that could al-
low such a response under certain conditions [15, 34], but
this would require discarding large amounts of the raw
key to remove Eve’s knowledge about the final key. For
gated APD-based detectors, there is a proposal to bound
the detector parameters by including a calibrated light
source inside Bob, randomly testing, and thereby guar-
anteeing the single-photon sensitivity at random times
[56]. Another approach suggests to move detectors out-
side the secure devices and thus outside the security proof
[59, 60].
If one only wants to avoid these specific attacks, pro-
posals for APD-based detectors [24, 25, 28, 33, 46, 47, 56–
58] should be equally efficient on SNSPDs, for instance
an optical power meter at the entrance of Bob. In an
installed QKD system, latching should be avoided either
by an automated reset, or by including a shunt resistor
8in parallel with the nanowire [61], but this does not guar-
antee that latching is precluded for all types of external
input. Developing such specific countermeasures effective
against specific, known attacks is less than satisfactory,
because this introduces an unproven extra assumption
into the QKD security model that the countermeasure
also eliminates all unknown attacks exploiting the same
loophole. Meanwhile, the difference between the device
and its model in the QKD security proof remains. This
approach would downgrade the level of QKD security
model to that of public-key cryptography, which also in-
cludes unproven assumptions (of computational complex-
ity).
As mentioned in the introduction, SNSPDs are still in
their infancy, and therefore our findings might not apply
to other detector designs. However, our findings clearly
demonstrate that unless detector control is specially con-
sidered during design, SNSPDs may be controllable us-
ing bright illumination, just as their APD-based cousins.
Furthermore, it could be possible to design the SNSPDs
to be compliant with security proofs for QKD. The early
stage of SNSPD technology is an excellent opportunity
to avoid detector control vulnerability for future genera-
tions of SNSPDs. Designing hack-proof detectors will be
crucial for the success of QKD.
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